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This article revisits the fiercely contested national curriculum history debates of the 1980s and 1990s. Although these debates have been subject to intense academic scrutiny, from educationists and historians alike, too little attention has been paid to the various assumptions about the inclusion (or exclusion) of hero figures in the curriculum. The article situates debate about heroes both in the context of late twentieth century educational reform, but also wider historiographical analyses of Britain's (or, better put, England's) perceptions of itself as a post-imperial power. In the battle to define the content of school history, certain commentators invoked hero figures to help press their cause. What becomes clear from analysis of media intervention, however, is an ambiguity about the place and cultural/political purpose of specifically 'imperial' heroes. This ambiguity, I argue, reflects contemporary unease about how to confront the imperial past.
History teaching has been captured by those who have no admiration of the past of their own country and see it as little more than a tale of imperialism abroad and oppression at home. Small wonder, then, that so many young people appear to have no love of their country, and so many are virtually strangers in their own land, mistrustful of its institutions and contemptuous of its heroes and leaders. We have a generation who are not just ignorant of their history, their literature and their religion, but who care nothing for any of it (Daily Mail, 18 April, 1995) .
In common with other contributions to this themed issue, this article analyses the cultural afterlives of imperial heroes in order to investigate the politics of imperial memory. My focus, specifically, is on the fiercely-conducted public debates between the 1980s and early 2000s about the teaching of history in English schools. The National Curriculum [NC] , set in motion following the Education Reform Act of 1988, was finally implemented in 1991 -yet debates about the purpose of the teaching of history both preceded and post-dated these key years. These debates were about the first national curriculum in English educational history; thus, the NC constituted the first time that the state would prescribe historical content and teaching methodology.
1 NC debates are of particular significance for a study of the cultural afterlives of heroes since they provide a useful means to consider the role of the state in framing an 'official', as opposed to an unofficial, memory of the national past. This is an important distinction. In a context in which 'History' was increasingly fragmented into consumerist histories, 2 whether through the increasing scope of film and television to serve as an interpretative lens on the past (as Max Jones' essay highlights) or as a result of the uses of imperial history or practices by former colony (as seen in Berny Sèbe's and Robert Bickers' articles), the 'battle' to shape NC history operated as a contest to control a state-sanctioned account of the national past. What purpose, specifically, was attributed to heroes? What does their inclusion, or exclusion, from the curriculum indicate about the relationship between official history and identity? Does their treatment reveal clues about the politics of imperial memory?
Use of the word 'battle' is not hyperbolic. 3 The formulation and implementation of the NC led on to furious debate across the late 1980s and 1990s -what one group of educational researchers in 1993 described as 'nothing less than a public and vibrant debate about the national soul'. 4 Militaristic words were invoked in media reporting: the Express described Thatcher's 'conquest' of schools (4 April 1990). But 'battle' was by far the most common. Robert Skidelsky wrote of the 'Battle for Britain's Past Times' in the Independent (22 August 1989) . Martin Kettle, writing for the Guardian at the height of these disputes, described their significance in an article entitled 'The Great Battle of History': 'Margaret
Thatcher has fought many historic battles for what she sees as Britain's future', yet 'few of them are as pregnant with meaning as her current battle for control over Britain's own history ... If the Prime Minister can change the way that we are taught history, she will have succeeded in changing the ground rules for a generation to come. It is a big prize' (4 January 1990). A considerable number of studies, especially those written by educationists, located debates about NC History within wider analyses of the relationship between history teaching and national identity. 5 Given that the NC was to relate to English and Welsh schools, the debate took on added significance in the context of scholarly intervention into Anglo-British identity-relations. 6 The importance of NC debates, moreover, is attested to by the expansive list of references to them in Hansard, the extent to which they have been 'remembered' in the memoirs of key political figures and the way in which they became a 'case-study' in political analyses of the Thatcher years. 7 The 'great history debate' was referenced in the 1990s in studies exploring the relationship between education and the state, 8 as well as its contributions towards children's perception of Europe and European integration. 9 It is no surprise that these debates have been visited by historians offering broad analyses of the relationship between history and identity: see, for instance, Peter Mandler's work on public history and Joanna de Groot's brief comments in her recent analysis of empire in the writing of history. 10 Yet few historians have investigated the significance of the statutory inclusion, or exclusion, of heroes in the NC; 11 a curious omission given the rich historiography of the study of heroes explored in this issue's introduction. This oversight includes David
Cannadine, Jenny Keating and Nicola Sheldon's history of twentieth-century history teaching,
The Right Kind of History (2011), which sought -in part -to situate debate about contemporary reforms to history teaching in historical context. 12 Heroes played a central role in debates, recruited by cultural critics in their battle to define nation and identity. Most obviously, they were used to illustrate newspaper articles -Kettle's essay, for instance, is illustrated by a half-page reproduction of a painting of the Death of Nelson (attributed to Corbould). Their presence, however, was more than mere decoration. The visual presence of key English figures emphasised that their potential exclusion posed a threat to the fabric of national history; they embodied a usable nostalgia in which critics of new approaches to the teaching of history -who had been building up a head up steam across the 1980s -could communicate their wish for the restoration of a 'traditional' curriculum. Heroes were used to embody the notion of loss; the loss of a golden age of history teaching in particular and the loss of curriculum which promoted patriotism in general. In May 1994, in response to a sense that insufficient British history had been included in a revised NC, the Star declared 'British heroes set to become History' (5 May 1994). Gary Bushell, in the Sun, beseeched the government not to 'let teachers turn our heroes into zeroes' (20 Sept. 1995 ). This special issue, then, gives me the opportunity to redress the surprising lack of scholarly analysis of the role of the hero in NC debates. My findings suggest that both the noise and silence in the treatment of heroes in last two decades of the twentieth century provide a useful means to assess the ambiguities of Britain as a post-imperial nation.
***
This article is organised into four sections. First, I outline alterations to the teaching of history in the 1970s and '80s. In this period, advances in educational psychology became manifest in teaching practice. The highly influential so-called 'new history' sought both to privilege the teaching of skills over chronologically-arranged factual content and make history relevant to the average schoolchild. 'Relevance' comprised a conscious move away from teaching narrowly English political history by providing increased attention to world history. This included the insertion of individuals from minority groups into teaching programmes, both those whose lives were intimately bound up with British history (such as Olaudah Equiano and Ghandi) and those from overseas (most prominently, Martin Luther King). The period also witnessed the creation of multiple resources for the teaching of heroines: Elizabeth Fry, Florence Nightingale, Mary Seacole, to name but a few. Such a dramatic shift in content and teaching methodology led to significant backlash, as analysed in Section II, in particular from New Right pamphleteers and right-wing journalists. The third section analyses the debates both about the formation of a national curriculum in 1989/90 and subsequent reforms to the curriculum up to 1995. In particular, I argue that the press took on a significant role by framing the debate as a series of binary opposites: patriotism versus antipatriotism, factual content versus skills/pedagogy, traditional versus newfangled. It was in this context that NC history became understood as the official national narrative and that the selection and omission of heroes, as key individuals who shaped that history, took on added significance.
The demand, by the New Right, for more teaching of the national past was at odds with a reluctance publicly to engage British imperial history, a paradox symptomatic of Britain's post-imperial identity crisis. 13 Given that questions over race and imperial memory were central to these debates, though not always explicitly articulated, the final section uses responses to the Parekh Report, The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000) to analyse the extent to which disputes over the teaching of history can be understood, in Anne-Marie
Fortier's words, as a 'politics of reckoning with the imperial past'. 14 In order to address issues of race-relations, the Report recommended an overhaul of the teaching of history. It was met with vitriol in the press, leading Jack Straw (the then Labour Home Secretary) to distance himself from its conclusions. My argument is that one can identify a continuity of criticism from the political right, from the 1980s into the 2000s, in which the request for more national history is put forward as a core ingredient of identity. Suggestions to rewrite national history -which included the perceived belittling or omission of key heroes -was seen to be testament to denigrating the nation. Yet, specifically imperial heroes are noticeable for their absence in this proposed pantheon: they were too controversial for inclusion in a curriculum that sought to promote unquestioned national greatness. The imperial past, and the end of Empire, was skirted in the 1980s and '90s, but confronted head on by the Parekh Report. The Report -in calling for 'a rewritten history of Britain as an imperial force' -necessitated an engagement with the imperial past in consideration of the relationship between history teaching and national identity. 15 Thus, analysis of those heroes included and excluded in debates about the teaching of history enables engagement with questions about the relationship between the imperial past and post-imperial ambiguities of identity. These dates, quantified in the findings of an ESRC-sponsored project entitled 'British Island Stories: History, Identity and Nationhood', witnessed significant surges in media reporting. 16 As part of the project, a database was compiled which documented all references in the mainstream press to the teaching of history between 1989 and 1995. It has been possible, as a result, to analyse these newspapers in order to quantify which heroes were most discussed:
I -Context
Nelson, Alfred, Nightingale, Wellington, and Churchill formed the canon of desirable heroes with few others mentioned. Those involved in the discovery, conquest and maintenance of colonies were noticeable for their relative absence: Clive and Wolfe each get one mention, Captain Cook and Livingstone two. There were no calls in the press for the compulsory reinstatement of Gordon, Havelock, Napier, Roberts, Kitchener, indicative of ambiguities about the usability of imperial past. Prior to analysis of NC reforms, and response to them, it is important to highlight changes in the teaching of history in the 1970s and '80s; especially so since the NC incorporated aspects of the 'new' history and it was as much the persistence of pedagogical innovation, as content, that was subject to consternation.
'New' history sought to make the teaching of history relevant to modern Britain and did so in light of research in the 1960s and early '70s which suggested not only that history had become unpopular with young people but that further disinterest would lead to its curricular extinction (analogy was drawn to the fate of Latin in comprehensive schools). 17 It also sought to teach a present-oriented curriculum which aimed to enable children an While there has been a sea, and sometimes stormy, change in the content of history syllabuses, there has been an earthquake in the methodology, pedagogy and above all, in the learning of history by young people in schools. Pupils are now being asked to evaluate source material critically. They are asked to enter into a degree of understanding of the attitudes and predicaments of people who are different from them, because they lived a long time ago, or were poor, or rich, or had a different colour, or religion, or sex, or aspirations. They discover that historical statements are ultimately not concerned with the transference of agreed facts but are nearer to the making of informed judgement. They are appreciating that such statements are often tentative and provisional and that contrasting and equally valid conclusions may be drawn from the same evidence.
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It was also understood that the content of lessons required alteration. In 1970, the educational theorist Martin Ballard argued, for its very survival as a discrete school subject, classroom history needed to 'break out of the narrow nationalistic straitjacket in which it had lived for so long'. 28 Advocates of new history sought to use history not only to teach essential skills, but to distance the teaching of British history from the 'teleological optimism' of 'traditional' anglocentric high-political history. 29 In order to make history relevant, the aim was to give minorities and others excluded from the traditional curriculum historical voice:
not just ethnic minorities, but women, the workers and the poor. 30 Advocates of new history sought, therefore, to make history meaningful to all British children in the modern world: famous dead Englishmen were to remain, but new content would witness the introduction of new historical actors -some of whom could be labelled 'heroes' -into history teaching. Moreover, new history encouraged children to ask critical questions about individuals: it would not be uncommon to find a lesson asking children to investigate why Clive was made heroic, but Guy Fawkes a villain. As will be seen in the next section, when critics of new history demanded the restoration of past practice it was precisely the 'traditional' system they wanted reinstated.
The SHP syllabus was organised into four approaches, or categories of historical 
II -Reactions and Response
The new history, therefore, introduced a new cast of characters into the teaching of history. It also introduced new pedagogies of learning and teaching which emphasised critical enquiry.
It is not surprising that many on the political right found these modules worrying. Their criticisms of the new history can be traced across the 1970s and '80s, first in a series of Black Papers, and then in pamphlets published by think tanks. 35 By the late '80s and the time of debate specifically about a national curriculum, critics had established a discourse of usable history that was to typify newspaper articles. 36 For them, History's prime purpose was to instil national pride. In their view, new history not only undermined this objective but deliberately subverted it: history needed to be rescued from the educationists since they were intent to teach leftist criticisms of the national past which, as a consequence, equated to a deliberate attack on the national present. For those antipathetic to 'new' history, it became a mission to influence the NC: state-prescribed history lessons had to privilege continuous national history, reinforce the teaching of knowledge through the incorporation of rigorous assessment structures, and -crucially -by teaching incontrovertible facts, serve as a site for the transfer of cultural identity.
Thatcherism was crucial to the escalation of the history debate because it gave voice and a sense of unity to 'the ideology' of the 'New' conservative Right. The New Right was a disparate group: not all who associated themselves with the New Right contributed to the rightist attack on 'new' history. I use the term in the singular, however, as a means to refer to those interested in the role of schooling with regards to the transmission of cultural values rather than those primarily interested in the economic aspects of the debate over schooling.
Indeed, despite the contradictions of the neo-liberal and neo-conservative values that constituted the New Right's ideology, they were nonetheless a political grouping highly influential in the shaping of the 'great history debate'. Frequently they held influence in conservative think-tanks and occasionally had the ear of ministers. 37 Neo-liberalism, on the one hand, was essentially an economic doctrine rooted in the thinking of Hayek: it was critical of socialism, promoted non-intervention in the economy and the freedom for the forces of the market to resolve issues of social policy -including education policy. Central to the neo-conservative stance, in contrast, was strong paternalistic government promoting disciplined society, social authoritarianism, hierarchy and subordination. It was thus that
Gamble commented that ingrained in Thatcherism was the inconsistency that to 'preserve a free society and a free economy, the authority of the state had to be enforced'. hopelessness, not days of hope'. 39 The 'new' history was, according to Stuart Deuchar, a 'wilfully perverse dismissal of historical content and facts' by left-wing 'experts' which had precipitated 'a fundamental loss of faith in our civilisation'. 40 History should be used to foster in the young a sense of belonging to the nation, added Geoffrey Partington (writing for the Social Affairs Unit), because there 'is a pride or reverence in our national past' that needs celebrating not undermining. Advocates of new history, in his opinion, were 'a host of irrational and malignant sprites' who sought to undermine British 'heritage and tradition'. 41 Robert Skidelsky, though not himself strictly part of the New Right, echoed their sentiment:
'new history', he feared, was the manifestation of a left-wing plot to erode national identity: a 'subversive history curriculum' had been 'socially engineered' by left-wing academics (Independent, 1 March 1988). 'New history' modules were labelled by their critics as a 'Shop Steward Syllabus', conducted by a 'Friendly Red Army' of teachers accused of 'peddling crackpot ideologies' and 'leaving our young people distrustful and confused'. 42 These are hardly surprising critiques given that the selection of content in the SHP syllabuses both reflected the 1960s' emergence of social history as a discipline and the 1970s trend towards 'world studies'. 43 Little wonder the political right baulked at the prospect of children studying histories of protest, working conditions, women's history and comparative global history; each of these alone threatened to teach children about the shadowy aspects of the British past; taken together SHP programmes were seen to constitute a leftist assault on traditional history and culture. Helen Kedourie, in her contribution for the Centre for Policy
Studies [CPS] -The Errors and Evils of the New History -added that new history was a
disgrace since it 'elevated world history above our own' which was 'so rich and varied'. 44 Kedourie took an axe to 'history from below' in particular, arguing that it denied children access to the 'the richness of history … to belittle the role of those labelled as great is to take a partisan and impoverished approach to history'. 45 Such critique would inform press response to the publication of the NC. New Right language was also evident in political intervention. It was within this context that debates about the teaching of heroes is so illuminating: the teaching of unconventional historical figures, it will be seen, was likened to the belittling of traditional heroes.
The trend towards teaching non-British history, or non-'traditional' history, had been recognised by the State before the NC History Working Group was formed in 1989. In its advice of 1988, the Department of Education and Skills suggested 'History courses should nowadays pay greater attention than was formerly the case to the position of minority groups and the role of women in history'. 46 Although this was somewhat tokenistic, and included no official recommendations (nor did the advice recommend specific historical characters), it nonetheless reflected changes to historical education and demonstrated the understanding that British history could not narrowly be taught by resort to the anglocentric narrative. This was evident when the final curriculum was published after a painstaking process of debate, several rewrites, and political intervention. When the NC for state Secondary schools finally emerged, it was a compromise document blending pedagogical techniques retained from the SHP but prioritising British history. In Raphael Samuel's words, it found itself 'facing both ways'. 47 Most debate related to the Secondary school curriculum, though -as seen belowthere was a conflation of Primary and Secondary school prescriptions in media response. The Not only were children to accumulate knowledge, they were also to learn about bias through the study of primary sources. Crucially for educationists, and to the dismay of critics, no definitive list of compulsory 'facts' would 'be drawn up for testing purposes that did not imply a particular interpretation'. 48 Thus, the curriculum resisted pressure only to only teach British history by including a broad sweep of British, European and world history. At secondary level it was chronologically arranged and privileged national history. Despite this, the final NC document met with serious criticism in the press and was subject to political intervention, including from the Prime Minister herself. It is to the analysis of these criticisms of the curriculum -and the role of heroes within debate -that I now turn.
III -Defining the heroic in a national curriculum for history, 1989-1995.
Much of the debate about the NC related to the political appropriateness of the Conservative government's explicit intention to use the classroom to inculcate patriotism. There was some minor dispute between Conservatives about state prescription, yet consensus prevailed about the requirement to teach chronological national history. 49 Jack Straw, then Shadow Secretary of State for Education, accused the Prime Minister in Parliament of turning the 'history syllabus into no more than a vehicle for the jingoistic, right-wing indoctrination of our children'. 50 There can be little doubt, as analysis below demonstrates, that these debates were about the definition of patriotism. I will return to the questions of political alignment below, especially the alternative canon of heroes suggested by left-wing academics in counterpoint to the overconcentration in the media on the use of heroes to impart national pride.
Analysis of the media treatment of heroes suggests they were inscribed with a particular patriotic purpose and that their inclusion/exclusion was debated largely around issues of patriotism and identity. Certain heroes were selected specifically because they were usable in the context of late twentieth-century England; others -those who had been core actors in the formation of the heroic myth of empire -Gordon, Havelock, Lawrence -were omitted. As will be seen, the majority of the media critique corresponded to Conservative political will: this was, in part, the exhibition of those populist strategies linking the state to Heroes should be known in a way that meant their heroism in the national cause could be taken for granted. There was no space in this formula for a critical approach to heroes (an irony explored in the next section of this article).
That the proposed NC failed to include sufficient national history led to serious condemnation in the press. 'The country that forgets its own history is dead from the neck up', Keith Waterhouse waxed in the Daily Mail in response to the NC Interim Report, continuing:
'all the evidence is that as a nation we are suffering from a creeping amnesia when it comes to our collective past' (21 August 1989). That insufficiency was accentuated by the absence of a compulsory place for heroes on the curriculum. Two days before the publication of the Right. In 1990, in a debate on 'History, the Nation and the Schools' held at Ruskin College, 65 he argued that this desire to return to a halcyon age of history teaching was owed to a modern crisis of British national identity demonstrating nostalgia for a time 'when "we" were more like "ourselves"'. 66 The restoration of a golden age of history teaching would, in
Clark's summation, rescue children from the condescension of 'post-liberal', 'post-imperial'
and 'postmodern' approaches to history education: in doing so, the aim was that this would return to them a simple and politically expedient historical knowledge-base out of which to understand their nation and their place within it. 67 'Patriotism', for Clark, was more 'than a series of sentimental anecdotes of Drake, Nelson or the Battle of Britain … [it] is essentially the idea that "we" are related to "our" history by something more than contingency'.
Nonetheless, heroes mattered since they could 'evoke' patriotism. 68 Anxieties of Englishness, then, were to be overcome by the implementation of the traditional as the official NC for history. Heroes, in the context of cultural restorationism, took on a significant role in the use of history to confer an unproblematic national identity. In lauding the value of national heroes by drawing derogatory contrast to 'politically correct' alternatives, media representations depicted a need for single national story which clearly excluded 'racial'
others from a place within the national narrative.
In his analysis of the relationship between the media and the discursive construction of the nation in newsprint, Michael Billig draws attention to the use of language -especially the frequency of words such as 'our' and 'we' -to connote national belonging. Billig's argument that 'national histories tell of a people passing through time -"our" people, with "our" ways of life, and "our" culture ... mobilised to tell the tale of "our" uniqueness and "our" common fate' -demonstrates that for the past to be 'usable', in a political sense, public consumption of the past needs be controlled through the discursive creation of a single, official, history. 69 Against a backdrop of (what was perceived to be an) increasing childhood fascination with historical films, period dramas, documentaries, museums, theme parks and computer games, 70 the 'official' history -in the shape of a national curriculum -was to be the single, definitive, account by which competing histories could be understood. The attempt to claim national heroes as instruments of official policy was deemed especially important since research had highlighted most children cited sports and musical celebrities as the individuals from whom they gained most inspiration. 71 An official history was compelled, in Robert Phillips' words, to 'respond to the political-public consumption of the past'. Nationhood was thus derived from a common, inherited past. 73 Scruton, writing in 1986 in opposition to world history modules, elaborated upon his thinking about the role of history in schools:
The first concern of the history teacher must be to teach the history of Britain, so that a child may understand the past in terms of its present and observable residue … [that allows the child] … that informed awareness of history as a living process, a form of communication with the past and the future, which stems from an awareness of the "pastness" of everything one touches, and of the evolving nature of existing social and political arrangements. The issue, then, was whose narrative of national history should be used? Clearly, this was an historiographical problem; but one which, in the context of NC debates, had become acutely political. That single, usable, and certaintist history around which the New Right wished to form an official curriculum was unachievable. Their insistence on such a curriculum, despite reinforcement by the press, provoked debate about competing national narratives and thus exposed history as essentially contested. These debates, too, also exposed national identity itself as fluid and subject to political control. For some New Right critics, heroes were deployed in battle against those who threatened their idealised and usable curriculum: whether that was Namibian women, the Beninese or Aztecs; or -indeed -leftwing academics and educational theorists who sought to subvert 'our' cultural heritage.
Deuchar was able to denigrate 'new' history as a 'manifestation of our postcolonial neuroses'; yet in admitting of neurosis acknowledged an obsession with a past that was not uniformly glorious. 84 Samuel was correct: debate about how to teach the empire was largely absent in the media, even though papers had clearly articulated a version of 'English' identity which was defined against others who would be the subject of world history modules. These debates, about the relationship between history teaching and national identity, were conducted largely without reference to the imperial past. This would explain why no New The question of race came to the fore in debates about how history -again an official history in recommendations for curriculum amendment -was intended to express nation and identity.
IV -Confronting the imperial past
The and Asia, is proving from this perspective to be an unmitigated disaster. 89 The extract from the Parekh Report is reproduced at length for three reasons. First, given that the architects of the NC had been condemned for their lack of patriotism because they had included insufficient English history, the uniformly barbed press responses to the Report indicate a continuity of practice a decade later: those who would challenge the core of national history would be attacked for denigrating British culture and identity. According to the Mail, the Report was a 'brainwashing exercise designed to destroy our sense of nationhood' (11 October 2000) . The Telegraph headline was entitled 'Thinkers who want to consign our island story to history' (note the recurrence of that phrase 'consign to history').
The article continued:
A think-tank called the Runnymede Trust will publish a major report tomorrow about Britain's multi-ethnic future. It says millions of contemporary British have been left out of a story that is "England-centred and, indeed, southern England-centred" ...
"Englishness is in the process of being redefined", says the report, The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, and the nation's very history should be rethought and certain aspects "jettisoned, revised or reworked". It wants Britain formally to declare itself a "multi-cultural society"' (10 October 2000).
As with NC debates, the press identified an assault on the integrity of Britishness itself through suggestions that national history needed consigned to the past.
Second, the media response illustrates the discourse of derision in continued operation:
although the Report was careful to differentiate between the terms 'racial' (a legal designation) and 'racist', newspapers highlighted alarm at the suggestion that there was shame in the past. The Star (12 October 2000) described the Report as 'the latest example of political correctness gone mad', incredulous at the suggestion -based on the Telegraph misreporting -that 'it is now racist to be British'. On the same day, the Sun, in alarmist fashion, summarised the Report's objectives: we should 'feel ashamed of our history and apologise'. 90 Concern was all the more acute since the Report had been convened at the behest of the then Home Secretary, Jack Straw, and was thus understood to be an attempt to put into a place an alternative official, institutional, narrative of British history. In the face of hostile media reporting, Straw was compelled to distance himself, declaring himself 'proud to be English and proud to be British' and 'proud … of the best of British values' (The Times,
October 2000).
Third, responses to the Report both exposed post-imperial identity confusion but also suggested the possible wedding of new formulae of Britishness which could take root from old histories. Parekh had proposed to teach a history of the present which would require an official declaration that British imperial history had bequeathed a problematic legacy for modern Britain. In drawing explicit attention to the deleterious impact of imperial history on modern social and racial cohesion, the Report forced the Right to confront those questions they had hitherto set to one side. Although it was straightforward for the press to denigrate the report and deride its proposal for future identity formation -around a 'community of communities' -debate, nonetheless, generated fascinating acknowledgements that British history itself had been composed of centuries of immigration. As a result, Fortier finds a number of letters written to the newspapers in which immigrants (or their descendants) queued up to declare their pride in being 'British'. 91 The Report had attempted to formulate models of Britishness which not only accounted for the past exercise of imperial power, but sought to use debate as the framework for new modes of civic belonging. However, in doing so, the Report had forced acknowledgement that there was not a single, uncontested, narrative of the national past, but several; that modern Britain was made up of multiple histories and multiple identities, forged as a result both of centuries of immigration and migration and empire building and decolonisation.
Abby Waldman explains that 'post-war immigration had led in Britain to an official recognition of communities which cherished multiple identities and loyalties'. 92 New history, the context of the 1970s and '80s, had sought to introduce students to non-British perspectives on the relationship between history and the unfolding of the modern world. Thus, the Schools Council conceived of modules charting Asian and African history which included opportunities to study histories of immigration and settlement. This explains why Mary
Seacole and Olaudah Equiano became regularly taught; it also explains why the complicated, divisive histories of characters such as Gordon and Havelock remained largely ignored in these curriculum debates, as they had been since the 1970s. New history, in Waldman's words, was 'a natural ally of pluralism'. 93 In terms of analysis of how Englishness was For Gilroy, the Empire could be 'actively forgotten' and memories of imperial atrocities 'repressed': national identity, drawn from history, could be forged through the duality of a deliberate detachment from the imperial past that still allowed taking comfort in selected historical moments. 94 In this context, those pleas in the 1980s and '90s for the compulsory teaching of Nelson, Henry VIII, Nightingale, and so on, can be understood as the search for a usable history -one that not only uses heroes as links in the chain of continuous national history, but also identifies heroes which articulate national values without forcing confrontation with the imperial past.
The Parekh Report thus provoked acknowledgement about the relationship between the imperial past, the teaching of history and national identity. The absence of imperial heroes in a prescribed pantheon of Englishness testifies to ongoing ambiguities of identity:
imperial memory remains too controversial to teach in schools. It is not possible to argue the Report was successful in its ambition. The Trust reported several newspapers to the Press Complaints Commission and was disowned by Straw. The Report, however, acknowledged that identity might derive from presentist civic ties as well as historical relationships.
Although it is only speculative to draw a line between the Report and subsequent amendments to education policy, and one need also to take into account that New Labour had a different vision of a NC for history, there have been some intriguing developments.
Statutory lessons in Citizenship were introduced in 2002. A popular textbook in schools, first published in 2008, not only teaches imperial history as a series of global relationships, rather than English imposition, but encourages children to ask questions about why certain characters -including Clive of India -became 'heroic'. 95 Neither development met with any animus in the press. This is surprising given that the textbook was produced by the SHP and deployed a range of pedagogical techniques encouraging children to question grand narratives. Moreover, citizenship lessons were conceived, following Linda Colley's advice in her Millennium Lecture in which she urged politicians to 'think hard about the distinction between identity and citizenship and focus on the latter'. 'Identity', for Colley, was no longer the glue that bound people together into a collective national unit; it was too 'ancestral and visceral'. Instead, she promoted citizenship because it was both 'political and functional' and could educate 'all of the inhabitants of these islands that they are equal and valued citizens irrespective of whatever identity they may individually select to prioritize'. 96 Under New Labour's watch, the essential necessity of history as the chief ingredient of collective identity was superseded by the need to teach attachment to civic state.
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Conclusion
This essay has sought to investigate debates about NC history in order to interrogate the notion that contestation about the content and teaching methods of history reveals anxieties of post-imperial identity. It is clear that the NC was intended to restore an unproblematic narrative of national history which, including the teaching of heroes, would -by designameliorate late twentieth-century identity confusion. Yet the teaching of history is neither straightforward, nor is the concept of identity. Identity is an elusive, slippery, and highlycharged political concept. It is not a monolithic entity and attempts to construct identity through the teaching of a single story of the past, played out in stories of keynote individuals, prompt as much perplexity as they do certainty. If anything, these debates reveal that anxieties about the place of imperial history and 'imperial' heroes in the curriculum not only compounded confusion, but demonstrate debates are more indicative of present-day concerns.
The teaching of imperial heroes was contingent upon their modern-day utility. As established in the introduction to this issue, heroes are culturally constructed in the image of the period that requires them. Nelson was usable, others were not.
Englishness was and remains at a crossroads, caught between a nostalgic sense of its glorious past and a future which that past had not predicted. Moreover, appeals to a common history may have aimed to ameliorate crises of identity, but, in seeking to reinstate traditional English heroes, NC debates also reveal ongoing tensions about definitions of post-imperial identity. In facing the future, it appears that collectively confronting that imperial past remains a contentious, yet necessary, part of the process of national redefinition.
Notes.
